Itisthusmanifestthattosayweperceivecoloursinobjectsisinrealityequivalenttosayingweperceivesomethinginobjectsandareyetignorantofwhatitis, exceptasthatwhichdeterminesinusacertainhighlyvividandclearsensation, , however, verygreatdiversityinthemannerofjudging: forsolongaswesimplyjudgethatthereisanunknownsomethinginobjects (thatis, inthingssuchastheyare, fromwhichthesensationreachedus), sofararewefromfallingintoerrorthat, onthecontrary, wethusratherprovideagainstit, , althoughweareinrealityignorantofwhatwethendenominatecolour, andareunabletoconceiveanyresemblancebetweenthecolourwesupposetobeinobjects, andthatofwhichweareconsciousinsensation, yetbecausewedonotobservethis, orbecausethereareinobjectsseveralproperties, assize, figure, number, etc., which, asweclearlyknow, exist, ormayexistinthemastheyareperceivedbyoursensesorconceivedbyourunderstanding, weeasilyglideintotheerrorofholdingthatwhatiscalledcolourinobjectsissomethingentirelyresemblingthecolourweperceive, andthereafterofsupposingthatwehaveaclearperceptionofwhatisinnowayperceivedbyus.
.
