Butthatwemaydistinguishwhatisclearinoursensationsfromwhatisobscure, weoughtmostcarefullytoobservethatwepossessaclearanddistinctknowledgeofpain, colour, andotherthingsofthissort, whenweconsiderthemsimplyassensationsorthoughts; butthat, whentheyarejudgedtobecertainthingssubsistingbeyondourmind, , whenanyonetellsusthatheseescolourinabodyorfeelspaininoneofhislimbs, thisisexactlythesameasifhesaidthathetheresaworfeltsomethingofthenatureofwhichhewasentirelyignorant, , whenlessattentivelyexamininghisthoughts, apersonmayeasilypersuadehimselfthathehassomeknowledgeofit, sincehesupposesthatthereissomethingresemblingthatsensationofcolourorofpainofwhichheisconscious; yet, ifhereflectsonwhatthesensationofcolourorpainrepresentstohimasexistinginacolouredbodyorinawoundedmember, hewillfindthatofsuchhehasabsolutelynoknowledge.
, figure, etc., areknownfardifferentlyfromcolour, pain, etc.
Whatwehavesaidabovewillbemoremanifest; especiallyifweconsiderthatsizeinthebodyperceived, figure, motion (atleastlocal, forphilosophersbyfancyingotherkindsofmotionhaverendereditsnaturelessintelligibletothemselves), thesituationofparts, duration, number, andthoseotherpropertieswhich, aswehavealreadysaid, weclearlyperceiveinallbodies, areknownbyusinawayaltogetherdifferentfromthatinwhichweknowwhatcolourisinthesamebody, orpain, smell, taste, ,[16] weyetknowwithfargreaterclearnessitspropertyoffigurethanitscolour.
, bytheoneofwhichweavoiderror, bytheotherfallintoit.
